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Abstract 
Islamic legal maxims had always held and will continue to hold a 
special position in jurisprudence. Jurists of all schools generally accept 
legal maxims as a basis of coming up with Shariah opinions. This is 
especially true if these maxims are based on the Holy Quran and the 
Prophetic traditions. Legal maxims can be used as evidence in extracting 
rules if it is based on the Holy Quran and the Sunnah because its use is an 
extension of the original proof, and thus, this article will relate some of the 
important legal maxims relating to the law of evidence. 
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A. Introduction 
In general, Islamic law includes the fundamental principles as well as the 
sub-rules. Fundamental principles are further divided into two types. First, 
what is known as usul al fiqh, which is rules and principles arising from the 
Arabic words and what relates to it, such as naskh. i.e. abrogation, tarjih, i.e. 
preference, etc. Secondly, universal legal maxims which are much in 
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quantity outspread in magnificence, inclusive of the rational and wisdom of 
Islamic rulings and injunction. Thus, the knowledge of Islamic legal maxims 
(Qawaid al Fiqihiyyah) is essential and complementary to the knowledge on 
the principles of Usul-al Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and Maqasid al 
Syariah (Objectives of Islamic law).1 
 
B. Method 
The knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-Fiqh) is one of the most 
honourable subjects require legal research, as it defines the ways of both 
legal aspects, i.e. criminal and civil matters. Furthermore, it encapsulates the 
divine rules and regulations about all humankind and specifies the methods 
that are to be applied. The knowledge of Islamic legal maxims  (Qawaaid al-
Fiqhiyyah) is very important and is complementary to the knowledge of the 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence and objectives of Islamic law (Maqasid 
al-Syariah). Although the main reference of this article is on The Mejelle al-
Ahkam al-Adliyyah, which is not considered as a primary source, it is 
nevertheless authoritative and essential reference. It is so since the extraction 
of the rules presents the right methodology and principles given that the 
divine texts (nass) provide general guidelines since rulings are getting more 
complex each day such that it necessitates a method of mining these legal 
maxims. 
 
C. Discussion  
The proof is of supreme importance to the administration of justice 
because, as a tradition of the Prophet says, "If people's claims were accepted 
on their face value, some persons would claim other people's blood and 
properties ...".2 The necessity of proof is thus a restrainer to false, weak, and 
unsubstantiated claims. This general principle occasionally entails some 
dangers because a claim, though authentic, is of no consequence if the 
claimant is unable to prove it. Only those claims, which can be substantiated, 
are upheld even though they are based upon some secretly forged, but sound, 
proof.  The Prophet warned those who make false claims by saying, “You 
come to me for adjudication. Perhaps some of you are cleverer in argument 
than others. If I should adjudicate in favour of a person against his brother 
depending upon the former's statements while the latter in reality is in the 
right, then I would only be handing the former a piece of hell. Let him not 
                                                             
1For further discussion, See Azman Ismail & Habibur Rahman. Islamic Legal Maxims: 
Essentials and Applications. (2013). Kuala Lumpur: IBFIM. Luqman Zakariyyah. Legal 
Maxims in Islamic Criminal Law: Theory and Applications. (2015) Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff, 
Printforce. 
2Marghinani, Hidayah, IV, p.141. 
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take it.”3 
The proof of a matter requires presentation of evidence until the matter 
attains the degree of certainty. Certainty is that which can be established by 
sight or proof, and It can only be dispelled by another certainty. Next in the 
degree to certainty is hesitation. It is consists of three categories: zann 
(conjecture), shakk,  (doubt), and wahm (fancy). Zann means siding, in case 
of hesitation, towards the correctness (of evidence). But it is not sufficient to 
prove the opposite of certainty, because "conjecture can by no means take 
the place of truth".4 It is particularly so if the fallacy in the conjecture is 
clear. Thus the Majallah says, "No validity is attached to conjecture which is 
tainted by error" (Article 72).5 However, if the conjecture is the most 
plausible (probable), it may take the place of certainty when the latter is 
unattainable. For example; if the sinking of a ship has been established, the 
death of those on board would be presumed based on plausible conjecture 
(probability). Shakk (doubt) is that which wavers between certainty and 
uncertainty but without either of these states being dominant over the other. 
Shakk is not sufficient to dispel certainty. Husayn al-Marwarrudi made this 
principle one of the four principles, which, he said, support the structure of 
jurisprudence.6It was embodied in the Majallah thus: "Certainty is not 
dispelled by doubt'-'  (Article 4).7 
Wahm (fancy) means siding, in case of hesitation, towards the 
incorrectness  (error) and is of no consequence. The Majallah says, "No 
weight is attached to fancy" (Article 74).8Likewise, the mere supposition is 
to be rejected. 
In summary, it is a fundamental rule that weight should only be attached 
to certainty and to what may be established by evidence. Thus the Majallah 
says,9 "No argument is admitted against supposition based upon evidence: 
Example: if a person admits while suffering from a mortal sickness that he 
owes a certain sum of money to one of his heirs, such admission is not proof 
unless confirmed by the other heirs, since' the supposition of such person 
defrauding the other heirs of their property is based upon the mortal 
sickness. If the statement, however, is made while in a state of good health, 
such admission is considered to be valid. The supposition of defrauding the 
heirs, in that case, is a mere supposition, and consequently, there is no 
                                                             
3Shahih Muslim Book V, p.128. 
4 Holy Quran 10: 6 
5 Ayni, Umdat, XIII, p.257. 
6 Taj al Din al-Subki in  Jam, II, p.373. 
7 Suyuti, Ashbah, 37 and 54; and Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, 22 and 29. 
8 This principle can be found in Majmac al-Fatawa by-Ahmad Ibn Muhammad In Abi Bakr. 
See the explanation of Article 74 in Mirati Majallah  Ahkami Adliyah. 
9 Guzelhisari, Manafi, p.329. 
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objection to the validity of the admission" (Article 73).10 Some things may 
be established by inspection; others require proof; the two methods are equal 
in weight. To use the words of the jurists and Article 75 of the Majallah, “A 
thing established by proof is equivalent to a thing established by visual 
inspection”.  
 
1. The Burden of Proof  
There are at least in every judicial dispute two litigant parties, the 
plaintiff and the defendant. The first claim what is contrary to the apparent 
fact; the second holds to the apparent fact and denies the claim.11 If proof, as 
we have seen, is such an important juridical requirement, it becomes 
important to know upon whom the onus of proof lies. There is no doubt that 
the burden is upon the plaintiff. 12 It is explained by the fact that what is 
apparent is presumed to be the original state; anyone who claims to the 
contrary must prove such a claim. The Majallah says, 13 "The object of 
evidence is to prove what is contrary to the apparent fact. The object of the 
oath is to ensure the continuance of the original state” (Article 77) and "The 
burden of proof is on him who alleges; the oath on him and who denies." 
(Article  76). The latter article is based upon a tradition of the Prophet 
(PBUH) to the same effect.14 
In other words, if someone claims something from another, he must prove 
it, because a defendant is presumed to be a free liability. Thus the Majallah 
says, "Freedom from liability is a fundamental principle. Therefore, if one 
person destroys the property of another and a dispute arises as to the amount 
thereof, the statement of the person causing such destruction shall be heard, 
and the burden of proof, as to any amount over the testified amount is upon 
the owner of such property.” (Article 8). This was one of the principle upon 
which the Shafie jurists based their theory of istishab or presumption of 
continuity and upon which they built similar principles such as: "It is a 
fundamental principle that a thing shall remain as it was 
originally"(Majallah, Article 5) and "Judgment shall be given in respect to 
any matter which has been proved at any particular time, unless the contrary 
is proved" (Majallah, Article 10). 
The principle of freedom from liability necessitates the rejection of a 
                                                             
10 This example is accepted by the Hanafi, School. Other schools, however, disagree on it. See 
Mahmassani, Nazariyah,  II, 142 ff.  
11 See the definitions of plaintiff and defendant in Marghinani, Hidayah III, p.142. 
12 See the Latin proverbs : "Actori incumbit probatio", and "Ei incumbit pro-batio qui dicit 
non qui negat." 
13 This is quoted with a variant reading in Khadimi's Majami. See uzelhisari, Manafi, 314. 
14 Mentioned by Suyuti in Jami Saghir, Nos. 3225 and 3226 on the authority of Tirmidhi and 
Baihaqi.  
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claim which cannot be proved, and requires a return to the original state; The 
Majallah says,15 “Things which have been in existence from time 
immemorial shall be left as they were” (Article 6). But this is qualified by 
another article, which reads: "Injury cannot exist from time immemorial" 
(Article 7). Furthermore, attributes are of two kinds: original and intervening 
(transitory). The original are those, which existed with the object initially, 
for example, presuming that a person who has reached adult legal age is of 
sound mind because the attribute of sanity is fundamental with the majority 
and exists with it initially. The intervening (transitory) attribute does not 
exist initially with the object described. It can be exemplified by madness or 
drunkenness. These qualities are not presumed to exist originally, and a 
person who claims their existence must prove his contention.  
The principle to be deduced from the aforementioned is that original 
attributes are presumed to exist, whereas intervening (transitory) attributes 
are presumed not to exist. The Majallah says,16 "Non-existence is a 
fundamental presumption attached to intervening (transitory) attributes. 
Example: In case of a partnership  (of capital and labour), if a dispute arises 
as to whether or not profit has been made, the statement of the person 
supplying the labour is heard, and the owner of the capital must prove that 
profit has been made" (Article 9). Lastly, it is necessary to indicate that the 
Majallah has an exception to the principle that the burden of proof lies on 
the claimant. Article 1774 reads: "A trustee (person to whom a thing has 
been entrusted for safekeeping) making a statement upon oath is worthy of 
credit".  
Thus if a person who has entrusted his property to another for safe-
keeping brings an action against that person, who in turn alleges that he has 
returned the thing entrusted to him, the trustee shall be believed if he swears 
that he has discharged his obligation. This provision is contrary to the 
general rule because the person to whom the thing was entrusted is making a 
claim contrary to the apparent fact and by analogy should be asked to prove 
his claim that he had returned the trust. The majority of Muslim jurists have 
accepted this exception. Only the Maliki’s did not, except where the thing 
entrusted was deposited with the trustee without accompanying evidence of 
deposit in the first place. However, if the thing entrusted was deposited with 
accompanying evidence and the trustee subsequently alleged its return, it is a 
duty to prove that he had.17 
 
 
                                                             
15 Guzelhisari, Ibid., p.26. This rule has other application such as “the limitation of time" 
(taqadum) and others.  
16 Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, p.25.  
17 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, II, p.57.  
The Position and Aplication of Islamic Legal Maxims (Qawaaid Al- … Mohamad Ismail 
 
48 
2. Precedence of Evidence 
Since it is established that a defendant is presumed to be free from 
liability until the claimant proves the contrary, it is important to know who is 
the defendant and who is the plaintiff, who of the two must bear the onus of 
proof, and whose evidence takes precedence in case of conflict. It is called 
precedence of evidence. The Majallah has given several examples to 
demonstrate it. One example will suffice to illustrate the point. If A claims 
that the thing in B's hand is his property and the latter disputes his claim, 
upon whom should the burden of proof fall? The Majallah states, "In an 
action for absolute ownership the evidence of the person not in possession is 
preferred" (Article 1757).  
It means that the person who does not hold the disputed property should 
prove that he is the owner because ownership belongs to the person who 
owns the property. It is the view of the Hanafi school and, according to one 
version, of the Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. However, the Imam Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal according to another version, and the Imams Malik and al-Shafi' i 
held that the evidence of the person in possession takes precedence.18 The 
maxims of the Majallah include a principle concerning precedence of 
evidence: 19 It is a fundamental principle that any new event shell is regarded 
as happening at the time nearest to the present. That is to say, if a dispute 
arises regarding the cause of some new event and the time at which it 
occurred, such event shall be considered concerning the time nearest to the 
present unless it is proved that it relates to a more remote period"  (Article 
11).  
Accordingly, "evidence given as to good health is preferred to evidence 
as to a mortal sickness. Example: A makes a gift to one of his' heirs and dies. 
Another heir alleges that the gift was made during a mortal sickness. The 
person in whose favour the gift was made alleges that the gift was made 
while in good health. The evidence of the person in whose favour the gift 
was made is preferred.” (Article 1766). In other words, the person in whose 
favour the gift is made has to prove his contention. If he fails, the gift would 
be considered to have been given in the course of mortal sickness, i.e., the 
time nearest to the present. In this case, it would only acquire validity if 
ratified by the other heirs by Article 879. 20 
Of course, pertains to cases in which the reason for precedence of 
evidence is clear. In other cases, if that of another should oppose the 
evidence of one party, one of three courses may be resorted to: both of them 
may be rejected, each may negate the other, and finally, one of them may 
                                                             
18 Dimashni, Rahmat II, p.205. 
19 Suyuti, Ashbah, p.43.  
20 This rule has exceptions in the Hanafi School ; see Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, Guzelhisari, 
Manafi, p.331.  
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take precedence using a lottery.21 Schools differed on these and other similar 
details. A study of Islamic works on jurisprudence shows that the principle 
of precedence of evidence is derived from the maxim: "The burden of proof 
lies on him who alleges". However, the jurists over the ages produced 
lengthy and detailed discussions on the subject. It gave rise to a collection of 
rules, which were handed down from one generation to another until they 
found their way into the Majallah. The outcome was the creation of 
complicated rules which somewhat limit the freedom of the judge in his 
inquiry into cases. If the judge had merely been limited by the tradition of 
the Prophet ' (The burden of proof is on him who alleges) without the 
subsequent details and complications, and if the enforcement of this tradition 
had been left to the discretion of the judge, the result would have been more 
consonant with the spirit of the Sunnah, and justice would have been better 
served. The principal means of establishing a fact are three: admission, 
evidence and oath. We shall briefly explain each one of these, confining our 
discussion to general principles. 22 
 
3. Admission And Confession 
 
a. The Effect of Admission and Confession 
The strongest proof for the establishment of the plaintiff's claim is the 
admission by the defendant of the matter claimed. Article 79 of the Majallah 
states, "His admission binds a person". 23 It conforms with the Quranic 
provision: "0 ye who believe! Be ye staunch in justice, witnesses for Allah, 
even though it be against yourself." (Holy Quran 4: 134). A tradition of the 
Prophet (PBUH) states, "Speak the truth even though it is against yourself". 
24 It is a prerequisite for a valid admission that the person making it should 
be of sound mind, free from duress and interdiction, and should have 
attained legal adult age (majority). Hence, admissions made by minors, 
lunatics or other interdicted persons and those made under duress are not 
valid.  
When a defendant makes an admission, he is not entitled to retract it if 
such admission pertains to the rights of other individuals. It is not applicable 
in hudud or questions relating to the rights of Allah (public rights), i.e., in 
penal matters where no rights of other individuals are involved, as in the 
case of the adulterer and the drunkard. In this second category of rights, a 
person may retract his admission in conformity with a tradition of the 
                                                             
21 Ibn Rajab, Qawaid, pp.363-64. 
22 Refer to Books 13 and i5 of the Majallah. 
23 Guzelhisari, Manafi, p.331 
24This is the latter part of a tradition mentioned by Suyuti in Jami Saghir No. 5004, on the 
authority of Ibn al-Najjar. 
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Prophet, which says, "Set aside punishment when there is a doubt". 25Several 
jurists, however, including the followers of the al-Zahiri school took 
exception to this rule on the ground that the tradition mentioned above was 
not authentic in that it was reported only as a saying of Ibn Masud and 
`Umar. 26 Moreover, admission on behalf of another person is not 
valid.27This means that admission binds only the person making it, unlike the 
force of evidence, which extends to third persons. The Majallah says, 28 
"Evidence is an absolute proof in that it affects third persons; admission is a 
relative proof in that it affects only the person making such admission" 
(Article 78) For example, if there were several defendants in a case of debt, 
and if some of them admit the debt while the rest deny it, admission will 
bind only those who made it. However, if the plaintiff should prove his claim 
by evidence, such proof would be binding upon all.  
Admission may sometimes be complete and entirely consistent with the 
claim; at other times it may be qualified or compound. The qualified 
admission is that in which the defendant concedes the claim of the plaintiff 
but attaches to his admission an additional statement which alters its 
connotation. An example would be for a person to admit his indebtedness 
but to add that the debt was not yet due. The compound admission is that in 
which a defendant admits the original fact (upon which the claim rests) but 
adds to such a fact another one closely tied to it, as where a defendant admits 
a debt but adds that he has paid it off or that the plaintiff released him of it. 
In such cases, should the defendant's admission be accepted in toto, or 
should it be divided into two parts with the result that he becomes bound by 
the debt and a duty devolves upon him to prove what he added to his 
admission? 
There are two points of view regarding this question. The first is that of 
the Hanafi and the Maliki schools 29 which accepts the division of admission. 
According to this view, the defendant becomes bound by the debt, and a duty 
devolves upon him to prove what he added to the admission. The second 
view disapproves of the division of admission because it considers it an 
indivisible whole. Thus if a defendant admits that he owes a sum of money 
but payable at a future date, he would not be made to pay it off before that 
date, because, as Ibn Qayyim l-Jawziyah says, "The defendant has made his 
admission on the basis of future maturity of the debt; to make him bound by 
it on any other basis is to make him bound by that which he has not 
admitted". Hammad ibn Salamah (d. 784-5 A.D.) relates a case in which a 
                                                             
25 Suyuti, Ashbah, p.84. 
26 Ibn IIazm, Muhalla, VIII, pp.252-53. 
27 Guzelhiari, Manafi, p.313. 
28 Ibn Nujaynn, Ashbah, p.101. 
29 Kasani, Bada i, VII, p.208. 
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man claimed the sum of 1,000 dirhams from another but without being able 
to produce evidence. The two men were brought before the judge of Basra, 
Abd al-Malik Ibn Yala, after that the defendant admitted the debt but added 
that he had settled it. The plaintiff seized upon the admission of debt to the 
exclusion of the defendant's statement as to settlement. Abd al-Malik held: 
"The admission may either be upheld in its entirety or discarded in its 
entirety".  
The Zahiri school accepted the principle of the indivisibility of 
admission,30and by the dominant opinion in the Hanbali school. It has also 
been accepted by most modern codes such as the Lebanese Code of Civil 
Procedure (Articles 226, 227) and the Lebanese Law on the Reorganization of 
Shariah Courts (Article 44). It is evident that this principle is sound and just. 
The following example explains it further: Suppose that a creditor who has 
been repaid makes a second claim for his money. Neither has the evidence to 
prove the original debt nor has the debtor evidence to show that he paid it 
back. If the debtor admits the debt, but with a statement that he has settled it, 
his admission should be considered in toto.  
For if it was proper to divide the admission, the debtor would be forced 
to pay back the same debt a second time because of his inability to prove the 
previous settlement, whereas if he had lied and had denied the entire claim 
the case would have been turned down because of the plaintiff's inability to 
prove it. Thus the division of admission in a case like this would encourage 
liars and would penalise the truthful. There is no consensus in the Shafie 
school regarding this rule. The Imam al-Ghazzali held that admission would 
not be divisible if the defendant admitted the debt but claimed that payment 
was only due on a future date, while it would be divisible if he admitted the 
debt but claimed its settlement.31 
 
4. Testimony of A Witness 
 
a. Acceptance of Testimony  
Al Bayyinah (evidence) in the linguistic sense means evident or obvious. 
In law, it has been used to connote "strong proof'' (Article 1676 the 
Majallah) because it makes the truth evident and obvious. Evidence in 
modern times is of two types written and personal. In the Islamic works on 
jurisprudence, it is usually used to connote the second type only, i.e.,  the 
testimony of witnesses. Personal evidence (testimony) has not been accepted 
in the various legal systems without hesitation and limitations. The reason 
for this reluctance is the forgetfulness of witnesses, their suppression of 
                                                             
30 Ibn Qudamah Muwaffaq), Mughni, V 285. 
31 Rafi, Fath XI, p.192. 
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evidence or willful distortion of facts resulting from partiality, incitement or 
bribery. Hence, laws have been very stringent in accepting testimony. 
Several legal systems have excluded such testimony in civil matters except 
in special cases. Other systems accepted testimony in all circumstances but 
required a minimum number of witnesses. Most modern legal systems, while 
accepting testimony without reservation in penal matters, reject it in civil 
transactions except in special circumstances. In the Lebanese Code of Civil 
Procedure, for instance, testimony is not considered sufficient to disprove 
the contents of a written document.  
Moreover, it is not acceptable in cases involving more than 55 Lebanese 
pounds,32 except in very restricted and exceptional circumstances.33 In 
Islamic jurisprudence, however, the dominant opinion among the majority of 
jurists has sanctioned testimony in all cases but has determined the minimum 
number of witnesses required. This number differs according to the different 
schools and types of cases. Despite this reservation, jurists have explained 
that the specification of the number of witnesses is a matter contrary to 
analogy because the determination of the truth depends upon the 
trustworthiness of witnesses and not upon their number.34 
 
b. Categories of testimony 
First -  The testimony of four. The various schools are in agreement that 
the number of witnesses required in a case of adultery is four men. The 
Quran refers to four witnesses in the following verses: "And those who 
accuse honourable women but bring not four witnesses, scourge them with 
eighty stripes" (Quran 24: 4); "Why did they not produce four witnesses? 
Since they produce not witnesses, they verily are liars in the sight of God" 
(Quran 24:13); and "As for those of your women who are guilty of 
lewdness, call to witness four of you against them"  (Quran 4: 15).  
The reason for stringency in such cases stems from the desire to shield 
women against unwarranted accusations. The testimony of women in such 
cases is not accepted, but according to Ata' (Ibn Abi Rabah d. 732-3 A.D.) 
and Hammad (Ibn Salamah) the testimony of three men and two women in a 
case of adultery may be enough. The Zahiri School equalised the testimony 
of two women to that of one man and thus provided that the testimony of 
eight women may be accepted in a case of adultery.35Al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 
728 A.D.) held that in murder as in adultery the testimony of four persons is 
                                                             
32Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, Articles 53 and 241.The amount was 10 Ottoman gold 
pounds according to Article 80 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure. See also Article 
1341of the French Civil Code. 
33 Article 242 of the Lebanese Code of  Civil Procedure. 
34 Zay1a 1, Tabyin, IV, p.212.  
35Ibn Qudamah (Muwaffaq) 275, Mughni, X, 75; and Ibn IIazm, Muhalla, IX, p.395. 
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required.36 Second– he testimony of three The Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal said 
that if a person known for his riches should plead poverty three witnesses 
would be needed to corroborate his statement. 37 
Third –The testimony of two men without a woman. Such testimony is 
sufficient in all other cases according to all schools, provided the two 
witnesses are legally competent to give testimony. The Quran and traditions 
provide for such testimony. In matters of testamentary disposition and 
divorce, the Quran says, "0 ye who believe! Let there be witnesses between 
you when death draweth nigh unto one of you, at-the-time of bequest two 
witnesses, just men from among you or two others" (Quran 5: 106); and 
"Then when they have reached their term, take them back in kindness or part 
from them in kindness and call to witness two just men among you, and keep 
your testimony upright for Allah" (Quran 65:2).  
The testimony of two just men is necessary according to all jurists in all 
penal matters with an unalterably fixed punishment (hudud) save in adultery. 
According to Malik and Ibn Hanbal, it is also necessary, in all non-property 
matters where men can have' knowledge of the necessary information such 
as marriage, divorce and similar matters. The testimony of women in all 
these matters is unacceptable (except according to `Ata', Hammad and the 
Zahiri school as mentioned earlier). 38 Fourth - The testimony of two men or 
one man and two women is that mentioned by the Quran in connection with 
the written evidence of a postponed debt; "And call to witness from among 
your men two witnesses. And if two men were not at hand then a man and 
two women (Quran 2: 282). All the Islamic schools are in agreement 
concerning acceptance of this testimony in cases involving property such as 
sale, loan, wrongful appropriation, and all kinds of debts. The Hanafi school 
has even accepted it in all other matters about private rights, i.e., in all civil 
matters whether they relate to property or other matters as marriage and 
divorce. It is not, however, acceptable in questions relating to the rights of 
God, i.e., Penal matters with an unalterably fixed punishment. The Majallah 
in Article 1685 accepts this testimony. The Zahiri school accepts this 
testimony in all cases involving private rights and in cases relating to the 
public (God's) rights exception adultery. 39 
Fifth -  The testimony of one man, and the oath of the plaintiff. This 
type of testimony was not acceptable to the Hanafi school, nor to the Imam 
al-Awzaie, nor al-Layth (ibn Saad d. 791 A.D.), one of the followers of 
Imam Malik.It is, however, accepted in all cases involving property, 
according to the other Imams, who base their acceptance on the Sunnah. 
                                                             
36 Ibn Qudamah (Muwaffaq) p.275. 
37 Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, p.144: 
38 Ibn Rushd, idayah 385. 
39 For all this see the references mentioned in the preceding footnote. 
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According to one tradition, the Prophet gave judgment based on the 
testimony of one witness endorsed by the oath of the plaintiff in support of 
his claim. 40The Caliphs Abu Bakr, `Ali ibn Abi Talib and `Umar  ibn 
`Abd al-`Aziz are also reported to have accepted this procedure.  
The opponents of this type of testimony have countered: that the 
Quran's stipulation for testimony is two men or one man and two women; 
that the tradition to the effect that the Prophet had accepted the testimony of 
one man endorsed by the oath of the plaintiff is substantiated by the 
authority of one narrator only; and that such a tradition cannot abrogate the 
text of the Quran.  
 
c. The Testimony of a Woman 
It is an accepted social fact that women are less experienced than men in 
matters of practical life. It has been the case since the ancient days. Some 
legal systems did not accept the testimony of women at all, such as the 
Jewish law; 41 where it was accepted, there were certain reservations. For 
example, the legal codes of some of the Swiss cantons, until the beginning of 
the 19th century, regarded the testimony of two women as equivalent to the 
testimony of one man, and similarly, in the old French law, the testimony of 
a woman was not accepted as equal to that of a man.42   
Even the Code of Napoleon, before it was amended in the latter part of 
the 19th century, excluded the testimony of women in testamentary 
dispositions and several transactions about personal status.43 In addition to 
her lack of practical experience, the Arab woman was customarily secluded 
from men. The Shariah took cognisance of this fact and accepted the 
testimony of women only in matters where women could be expected to 
know necessary information. In economic transactions, where women are 
usually less informed than men, a woman's testimony was considered as 
equivalent to half that of a man. Thus, the Koran, in the course of urging that 
debts which mature in future should be written down, states: "And if two 
men be not at hand then a man and two women of such as ye approve as 
witnesses, so that if the one erred, through forgetfulness, the other will 
remember" (Quran 2: 282).  
This constituted considerable progress in comparison with the status of 
women during the pre-Islamic era where a female child was in danger of 
                                                             
40 Reported by Malik in Muwatta (see Suyuti, Tanzwir, II, 108);Shafic in his Musnad (see 
Shafie, Kitab al-Umm, VI, 56) Muslim in Sahih, V, p. 28; Ibn Hanbal ; as well as the writers 
of the four Sunan books, Daraqutni, and others, p.104. 
41 Sabri, Muqaranat, Article 51. 
42 See these, examples and others in Alfred Thabit's thesis, La preuve testimoniale en droit 
ottoman, (Lyons, 927), pp. 9-31. 
43 Articles 37 and 980 before they were amended by the law of 7 December 1897. 
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being buried alive and was denied many civil rights including inheritance — 
the differences between the various schools concerning the testimony of 
women if in the company of men. The conditions wherein the testimony of 
women alone may be considered. A tradition of the Prophet (PBUH) reads, 
"The testimony of women is permissible in matters to which men have no 
access".44All the schools accept this principle. The Majallah says, "In places 
where males cannot be possessed of the necessary information, the evidence 
of females alone will be accepted in respect of property" (Article 1685). 
These matters include birth, female defects, etc. They also include lactation 
in most schools, excluding the Hanafi. There has been some controversy 
over the number of women witnesses in such matters. The Hanafi and the 
Hanbali schools have held that the testimony of one woman is sufficient. 
They based their ruling on a tradition of the Prophet to the effect that he 
had accepted the testimony of a midwife concerning a question of birth, 45
 and on the fact that the Caliph `Ali and al-Qadi Shurayh were reported to 
have followed suit. The number of women witnesses according to the other 
scholars varies; in the view of Imam Malik two are required by analogy with 
what constitutes a sufficient number of male witnesses.46 According to 
 `Uthman al-Batti three women witnesses are necessary, and according to al-
Shafie four are required.47 Now in cases other than those where males could 
not be expected to possess the necessary information, would the testimony of 
women alone be acceptable? Imam Malik held that the testimony of two 
women with the oath of the plaintiff in cases involving property would be 
adequate. It is also by one opinion of the Hanbali school. The Caliphs Umar 
and Ali and al-Qadi Shurayh are reported to have accepted the testimony of 
four women in cases of divorce, dowry and other similar cases. The 
testimony of women according to the Zahiri school, as pointed out earlier, is 
acceptable in all cases provided the testimony of two women is considered 
as equivalent to that of one man. 48 
 
d. The testimony of a man 
As pointed out earlier the testimony of one man, if supported by the oath 
of the plaintiff, is acceptable in all cases involving property, according to 
several imams. But such testimony is not acceptable without the oath of the 
plaintiff. The reason stems from the fear of false testimony and the desire for 
the safeguarding of people's rights and property. This was the same reason 
                                                             
44 Zaylai, Tabyin, IV, p.209. 
45 Ibid. 
46 For exceptions see Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat, I, p.240. 
47 Shafici, Musnad; see his Kitab al-Umm, VI, p.253. 
48 Ibn Jazzi, Qawanin, 310; Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, IX, 397 ff.; Ibn Qudamah,Muwaffaq, 
Mughni, XII, 15; and Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, pp. 37 and 141. 
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which also prompted several ancient legal systems such as the Roman 
law,49Canon  law, and the old French law,50 not to be satisfied with the 
testimony of one man or, if accepted, then not without reservations.  
This consideration is also behind the rejection of testimony by many modern 
codes in civil matters except in special circumstances, and their insistence on 
having more than one witness in important cases. For example, English law 
insists on having at least two witnesses to prove the crime of high treason.51 
The Hanafi school amongst others accepted the testimony of one man in 
exceptional cases. For example, sole testimony is permissible in cases of 
birth where the testimony of a woman alone is adequate.52 Also, the 
testimony of the teacher alone is sufficient in cases of juvenile delinquency. 
Similarly, the testimony of one expert is permissible for the assessment of 
damage to property. Individual testimony is also permissible for 
recommending or taking exception to the trustworthiness of witnesses, for 
serving notice about the removal of an agent, or about the defects in the 
object of a sale, and other similar matters.53 These include the statements of 
an interpreter upon whom a judge may depend in the translation of the 
statements of either of the two parties or in cases where the witnesses are not 
familiar with the official language of the court. Thus the Majallah 
says,54"The word of an interpreter is accepted in every respect" (Article 71). 
The translation of one trustworthy interpreter is sufficient according to the 
Imams Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and Malik. But in the opinion of 
Muhammad (al-Shaybani), and others the translation, like the testimony of 
one man, is not sufficient.55 
However, the Hanafi jurists have pointed out that in those cases in, which 
the testimony of one man is not acceptable, the specification of a larger 
number is a matter contrary to analogy, because the discovery of truth 
depends upon the trustworthiness of witnesses and not upon their number.56 
Therefore, they do not attach much weight to a great number of witnesses in 
the evaluation of evidence. For this reason, circumstantial evidence has been 
                                                             
49"Ut unius testimonium nemo judicuin in quaecumque causa facile patiatur admitti"; Digest, 
D. liv.XXII, tit. fr.2; and Codex, C. IV, tit. 01 
50 Cf. the Latin proverb, "Testis unus testis nullus." See Planiol, Traite, TT, No. 105 ; Thabit's 
thesis, op. cit., I Io; Pothier. Oblig., No.83; and Bonnier, 30R ff. 
51 Harris, Principles, p.36. 
52 Zaylai,.Loc.Cit. 
53Ibn Wahban in Manzumat, 61, mentions eleven instances. Ibn Nujaym in Ashbah, 88, adds 
one more instance. Ali Hayder in his commentary on Article 1825 of the Majallah mentions 
fifteen instances based on Abu al-Su’ud. For similar cases in the Maliki School see Ibn 
Farhun, Tabsirat, I, 231 ff.  
54 Ibn Nujaym, Asbah, 51. 
55 For the details see Qadikhan, Fatawa, II, 378; Ayni, Umdat, XXIV, 266; Shawkani, Nayl, 
VIII, 234; and Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat, I, p.237. 
56 Zaylai, Tabyin, IV, p.212. 
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accepted in many cases. 
Lastly, it is necessary to point out that there were Muslim jurists who 
were satisfied with the testimony of only one truthful witness. One of them 
was Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah who said, “Everything which brings out the 
truth constitutes evidence. Neither God nor His Prophet disregarded a right 
after it had been established by any means. That which was prescribed by 
God and His Prophet is that once the truth has come out by whatever 
method, it should be implemented and endorsed and may not be annulled or 
suspended".57 Following up his argument Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah says, "A 
judge may give judgment in cases other than those involving the rights of 
God on the testimony of one man whose integrity is established. God did not 
make it a duty for judges not to give judgment save on the testimony of two 
witnesses, but merely ordered the owner of a right to safeguard his rights by 
two male witnesses or one man and two women. It does not mean that a 
judge may not give judgment on any lesser testimony.  
The Prophet gave judgment based on one witness and an oath and even 
based on one testimony only". 58In other words, "the methods by which a 
judge gives judgment are of greater attitude than those through which God 
has guided the owner of a right to safeguard it".59 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah 
referred in his contention to a statement by Ibn Taymiyah to the effect that 
the Quran makes no mention of the testimony of two male witnesses or one 
male witness and two females concerning the procedure by which a judge 
arrives at a judgment, and that the Quran merely mentioned this procedure in 
connection with a person's endeavour to safeguard his right.60 Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyah based his contention on a tradition in which the Prophet 
approved the stele testimony of a Bedouin about sighting the crescent moon 
which signals the beginning of Ramadan fasting. He is also reported to have 
accepted a sole testimony in a case of robbery and to have accepted the sole 
testimony of a woman in a case where only women can know the necessary 
information. He is also reported to have considered the testimony of 
Khuzaymah, a man of unassailable integrity, as equivalent to two, saying, "It 
is sufficient unto a person to have Khuzaymah as a witness".61 
This last tradition upon which the Hanafi school based their argument 
that "what has been proved contrary to analogy should not be used for 
further analogy" was construed by Ibn al-Qayyim as evidence that the 
acceptance of one witness "is not a special privilege for Khuzaymah to the 
exclusion of other Companions who were equal to, if not better than him. If 
                                                             
 57Ibn Qayyim, Islam, I, pp.192-93. 
58Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, pp.66-67. 
59Ibn Qayyim, Islam, I, p.81. 
60Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, p.70.  
61 The sources or this tradition have been previously mentioned. See Part III, footnote 76. 
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Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali or Ubayy ibn Ka’b had given testimony, any 
one of their testimonies would be more entitled to such privileged 
consideration". In other words, Ibn al-Qayyim interprets the tradition as 
having been based on a cause, namely the integrity and truthfulness of 
Khuzaymah. Therefore, a judge may, by analogy, accept the testimony of 
any single witness if his truthfulness is established. The tradition thus does 
not conflict with the Koran, and like other parts of the Sunnah, serves to 
"interpret it, explain it and qualify its absolutes". Several famous Muslim 
judges like Shurayh and Zurarah ibn abiAwfa had accepted this latter 
interpretation and had given effect to it in their rulings. Abu Da'ud in al-
Sunnah and Iyas ibnMuawiyah1(d. 122 A.H.) also ruled likewise.62 
 
5. The Condition of Trustworthiness  
In addition to the number of witnesses required, there are prerequisites of 
trustworthiness to which a witness must conform. Thus, the testimony of a 
person who is notorious for lying or for the bad character is unacceptable 
and some schools, as well as the Majallah, make it a requirement to 
investigate the uprightness of witnesses both publicly and privately.63 
Further, the testimony of a witness is unacceptable if an enmity exists 
between him and the party against whom the testimony is to be given. Nor is 
it acceptable where prospective benefit or avoiding of loss may be involved 
such as in situations where there are blood relationships, or relationships of 
employment, partnership, surety-ship and the like. For example, the 
testimony of a father in favour of his son or vice versa is not admissible, but 
it may be utilised if the testimony of the one is against the other. 
Similarly, the testimony of one spouse against the other is admissible, but 
not if it is in favour of him or her, except in the Shafi’i school.64 However, 
the prerequisites for trustworthiness should be viewed in a relative sense, 
i.e., in the light of the witness's environment and background. Thus, some 
Maliki jurists have accepted the testimony of non-trustworthy witnesses in 
cases of necessity and the testimony of a person of unknown trustworthiness 
in minor cases.65 
 
6. Administering the oath to the witness  
There are two views in the Shari’ah concerning the administering of oath 
                                                             
62Ibn Qutaybah, Ma’arif, 207; and Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat, I, pp. 81-82.  
63 See Article 1716 f f. For investigating the uprightness of witnesses, Abu Hanifah requires 
that the person against whom the testimony is made should have a chance to question the 
trustworthiness of such witnesses. 
64 Nawawi, Minhaj, p.135.  
65 Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, 125; Ibn Abidin, Qurrat Uyun al-Akhyar (the continuation of Radd), I,
 73; Kharashi, Sharh, V, 187; and Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, IX, 379, No. 1783. 
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to a witness. The first maintains that no oath need be required because the 
word testimony (shahadah) implies an oath. It is the opinion of the Hanafi 
school. The second view requires the administering of the oath because it 
maintains that the trustworthiness of witnesses has become in doubt and 
should be reinforced by oath. The Imam Ibn Abi Layla and Muhammad ibn 
Bashir, Judge of Cordova, and other early prominent judges adopted this 
view; the Hanafi jurist Ibn Nujaym and the well-known Hanbali Imam Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyah also adopted it, the latter saying: "If a judge is entitled 
to separate between witnesses if his suspicion were to be aroused as to their 
veracity, it would be even more proper in that case to put them to the oath". 
Similarly, in the Maliki school, the judge may put a witness to the oath in 
case of suspicion.66 
The Majallah accepted this requirement. Article 1727 reads: "Should the 
person against whom evidence is given ask the court, before giving 
judgment, to put the witnesses on their oath that their evidence is not false, 
the court may, if it deems necessary, strengthen its evidence by 
administering the oath. The court may inform the witnesses that their 
evidence will not be accepted unless they swear the oath". Modern codes 
have on the whole called for administering the oath to the witness before he 
gives his testimony. Thus the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that "a witness, before giving testimony, must take an oath that he says the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth" (Article 272).67 
 
7. A plurality of witnesses and general hearsay  
According to the majority of jurists, if two sets of testimonies should 
conflict, preference need not be given based on the number of witnesses on 
each side.68 The Majallah says, "No importance is paid to the mere number 
of witnesses; that is to say, if one of the parties has more witnesses than the 
other, he will not be preferred for that reason alone. If the number of 
witnesses, however, is so large (tawatur) that they conclusively substantiate 
the evidence, they will be preferred" (Article 1732). The Majallah, further, 
defines the conclusively substantiated evidence (tawatur) as: "Statements 
made by several persons where it would be contrary to reason to conclude 
that they had agreed to tell a lie" (Article 1676).  
                                                             
66 Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat, II, p.21. 
67 See also Article 9 of the Shar’i Courts Organization Law, issued by legislative decree 
No.241 of 4 November 1942, as amended by a decree passed on 4 December 1946, which 
required courts following the sunni schools to make the witness take the oath before giving 
his testimony, and left the choice to do that for the Jafari (Shi’ah) courts.  
68 Preference on the basis of the comparative trustworthiness of witnesses is accepted only in 
the Maliki School. See Dimnashqi, Rahmat, II, 06; Ibn Jazzi, Qawanin, 02; Ibn Malak, Sharh, 
33; Nawawi,Minhaj, 139; and Ibn Qudamah (Muwaffaq), Mughni, XII, 176; and Tasuli, 
Bahjah, I, 45. 
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Such statements are the strongest type of evidence according to the 
jurists, even stronger than the testimony of two witnesses.69 The Majallah 
states that "conclusively substantiated evidence is tantamount to positive 
knowledge, and no evidence is entertained contrary to it" (Article 1733). It is 
a condition that its object is probably physically and rationally so that real 
certainty may be established. There is a controversy, however, about the 
number of witnesses required. The Majallah has adopted the dominant view, 
which makes no provisions as to numbers. It states, "No definite number of 
persons is necessary to constitute conclusively substantiated evidence 
(tawatur).  
Their number must be so considerable, however, that it would be contrary 
to reason to conclude that they had agreed to tell a lie"  (Article 1735). The 
determination of their number, thus, was left to the discretion of the judge, 
which became a cause for controversy. The Advisory (Fatwa) Department of 
the Ottoman Masheikh (Islamic Council) stated that the number of witnesses 
should not be less than twenty70 , but the Ottoman Court of Cassation held 
that the number should not be less than twenty-five.71 The Majallah 
provision was misused in fact until it was abrogated in Syria and Lebanon by 
an ordinance of the French Commissariat in 1926.72 Such conclusively 
substantiated evidence is not known to modern laws in a sense we 
mentioned, namely, that it emanated from persons whose number is 
sufficient to establish positive knowledge. However, modern laws comprise 
similar provisions, namely the acceptance of evidence-based upon rumours 
and hearsay but such evidence is only acceptable on rare occasions.73  
For example, Article 252 of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure 
provides: "Evidence based on hearsay is not acceptable save in exceptional 
circumstances where the law provides for the acceptance of this evidence as 
a punishment for negligence or malicious intention". Similarly, the Maliki 
school considers evidence based-on hearsay sufficient in various instances 
and provides that two witnesses are adequate in establishing it.74 
 
 
8. Evaluation of Evidence  
Is a judge entitled to evaluate the testimony presented to him, or is he 
                                                             
69 Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, p.180.  
70 As mentioned by Ali Haydar in his commentary on Article 735 of the Majallah.  
71 See the decision issued on 3 September Financial year) 309, in the Turkish journal 
Mahakim, No.53, p. II172. 
72Decision No. 2 of 9 January 926, published in the Lebanese official Gazette, No.1952 of 5 
March 1926. 
73 For example, Articles 415, 442, and 504 of the French Civil Code. See also Bonnier, 
Op.Cit., p.20 ff. 
74 Kharashi, Sharh,V, p.12.  
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duty bound to give judgment by it? There are two views on the subject. The 
first holds that a judge, after hearing the witnesses, should give judgment by 
their testimony without hesitation or evaluation. Such was the stand taken by 
several legal systems such as the French law in the 18th century and the old 
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure.75 The second view regards testimony as 
no more than a means for investigating and establishing the truth. Therefore, 
a judge is entitled to evaluate it and to assess its trustworthiness in his 
conscience so that if he is convinced of its authenticity, he will give 
judgment accordance with it, and if he were not convinced, he would reject 
it. It is the view of most modern codes; for example, Article 278 of the 
Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure states: "The court which hears the facts is 
the one to evaluate the worth of testimonies, and its evaluation is final".76The 
same right of evaluation is given to the judge by the Lebanese Shariah 
Courts Organization Law.77 
The shariah adopted a middle course. Like the first view, it regards 
testimony as binding upon a judge; he may not postpone pronouncing 
judgment after hearing it except to bring about an amicable settlement or 
unless requested to delay judgment by the plaintiff.  The shariah, however, 
embodies safeguards to ensure that testimonies be truthful to the greatest 
possible extent. Several prerequisites were laid down for acceptance of 
testimony including the trustworthiness of witnesses, as we have already 
seen. This stipulation of trustworthiness gave the judges wide latitude in 
rejecting witnesses for the reason of bad character or undependability. Most 
of the schools made it a condition that a judge ascertains both secretly and 
publicly the integrity of witnesses.  
Thus, the Majallah says, "The inquiry as to the credibility of witnesses 
shall be addressed either publicly or privately to the person having authority 
over such witnesses. Thus, if the witnesses are students, the inquiry shall be 
addressed to the teacher of the school in which they are carrying on their 
studies, if a merchant, from reliable persons who are also merchants . . . " 
(Article 1717). The Ottoman Mashyakhah (Islamic Council) and the 
Department of Fatwa ordered that the shariah judges when in doubt about 
the veracity of witnesses, should themselves investigate their background 
and should not be satisfied with the usual public and private inquiry.78 At the 
same time, some Muslim jurists adopted the second view. They maintained 
that to make a judge bound by the testimony is contrary to analogy because 
                                                             
75 Bonnier, 303 ff.  
76 Adopted in Jordan as the Evidence Amendment Law of 1928, published in the official 
Gazette, No. 211 of 6 December 1928. 
77 Shariah Courts Organization Law, Article 92, amended on 4 December 1946. 
78 This order was issued on 28 Jumada I, 1332 A.H., corresponding to 9 April (financial year) 
1330, (1914 A.D.), published in al-Jaridah al-Ilmiyah, No. 1, p. 36. 
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testimony is information, which is liable to be right or wrong. Some of them 
such as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah went so far as to say that a judge should 
arrive at the truth by any means at his disposal, even by the sole testimony of 
a truthful man, and that testimony is no more than a way to attain the truth, 
which must be upheld. Ibn Nujaym in Al-Ashbah wa al-Naza'ir declared that 
a judge might postpone judgment if he entertains any doubt.79This procedure 
affords the just judge a practical and wise method to evaluate a testimony so 
that if its authenticity is established for him and his conscience is satisfied; 
he could give judgment in accordance in addition to that. If, on the other 
hand, there is any doubt in his mind, he may turn it down so that he could be 
certain that he was performing his duty as required by the Quran: "If ye 
judge between mankind that ye judge justly" (Quran 4: 58).  
 
9. Counter testimony  
One last question: Is the defendant entitled to present counter-evidence to 
disprove the evidence of the plaintiff? If a defendant can produce evidence 
with which to disprove the claims of the plaintiff and to establish his non-
liability,80he may present such evidence in the view of all jurists. However, 
if he has no such evidence, he is still entitled to dispute the trustworthiness 
of the plaintiff's witnesses by submitting evidence to that effect.81 Most 
modern legal systems have gone even further than that by permitting a 
defendant in all circumstances to submit counter-evidence. Thus Article 255 
of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure states: "It is not necessary that the 
decision  (which orders the hearing of witnesses) should specifically permit a 
defendant to summon counter witnesses because every investigation must of 
necessity permit counter investigation". Furthermore, the inquiry as to the 
integrity of witnesses is no longer necessary. Whereas such inquiry was 
necessary according to the Majallah (Article 1716), it was left to the 
discretion of the judge according to a Lebanese law issued on May 29, 1929. 
Finally, such inquiry was abolished altogether by Article 278 of the 
Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, and a judge is, therefore, unequivocally 
restrained from resorting to it.  
 
 
 
10. The Oath (Al-Yamin) 
 
                                                             
79 See Ibn Qadi Samawah, Jami’, I, 16; Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, 89; and Ibn Qayyim, Turuq, 
180. 
80 This applies in actions for debt or actions pertaining to contracts whose subject matter is a 
specific thing. Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, II, 91; and Mawwaq, Taj, VI 213. 
81Article 1724 of the Majallah, and Adawi, Hashiyah, V, p.159.  
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a. Tendering the oath  
We have stated that the legal methods of proof are an admission, 
testimony, an oath. If a person brings an action against another, and the latter 
denies the claim, the plaintiff must present evidence. If he fails, he may ask 
that the defendant is required to deny the claim under oath; otherwise, the 
plaintiff's claim would be rejected. A tradition reveals that the Prophet once 
asked a plaintiff, "Do you possess evidence?" The plaintiff replied in the 
negative, after that the Prophet said to him, "You may ask for his 
(defendant's) oath".  The plaintiff replied, "He readily swears and does not 
care". The Prophet said, "You have nought but these: your two witnesses or 
the defendant's oath".82 An oath may only be sworn in the name of God 
according to a tradition, which reads: "He who swears must swear by no 
other than God".83 The oath has been sanctioned in cases involving property 
and chattels but is not acceptable in penal matters involving public (God's) 
rights. In other matters, opinions differ as to its acceptability. If a plaintiff 
tenders the oath to the defendant, three courses may be followed: the 
defendant may take the oath, he may refuse to do so, or he may retort the 
oath to the plaintiff himself.84 
 
b. The defendant taking the oath 
If a defendant testifies under oath that he is free of the claim advanced, 
such a claim would be dismissed. There is no controversy on this point; 
however, the controversy is whether or not to accept testimony after the oath 
has been taken. In other words, if the plaintiff should offer evidence after the 
defendant had denied the claim under oath, should such evidence be 
accepted or not? There are three views on this question. The first maintains 
that the oath is a weak method of proof, which does not terminate a dispute. 
Therefore, evidence may be heard even after the defendant had denied the 
claim under oath. It is explained that evidence is the original method of 
proof, whereas the oath is the substitute which can be overridden by the 
original method. The Caliph Umar is reported to have said, "A lying oath is 
more deserving of rejection than trustworthy evidence". Several jurists of 
old, including Ibrahim  (al-Nakh’i) and Shurayh, and the Hanafi, Shafi’i and 
Hanbali schools agree on this point. The Majallah, however, contains no 
                                                             
82 Sarakhsi, Mabsut, XVII, 0. Bukhari gives a variant reading; see Ayni, Umdat, XIII, 243 and 
248. 
83 Suyuti, Jami’ Saghir, No. 9866, on the authority of Nasa’i.  
84 On this subject see Sarakhsi, Mabsut, XVI, 119 and XVII, 29; Kasani, Bada’i, VI, 229 ff.; 
Shafi’i, Kitab al-Umm, VII, 34 ff., and 140; Malik, Mudawwanah, XIII, 24; Ibn Hazm, 
Muhalla, IX, 371 ff; Aymi, Umdat, XIII, 257; Ghazzali, Wajiz, II, 265; Ibn Qudamah 
Muwaffaq), Mughni, XII, 124 ff; Ibn Qayyim, Ilam, III, 344; Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, II, 86 ff. ; 
and Ibn Qayyim, Turuq,117 ff.  
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explicit provisions concerning this matter, and whenever the question arose, 
reference was made to the Hanafi works representing the first point of 
view.85 However, such a situation was of a rare occurrence for two reasons. 
First, putting the defendant under oath, according to Abu Hanifah, is not 
permissible except when the plaintiff fails to produce evidence.86 
Secondly, the Majallah states,"A plaintiff who has stated that he has no 
witnesses will not be permitted to say later that he intends to call witnesses. 
And if he has stated that he intends to call a certain witness and no other, he 
will not be allowed to call any other witness"  (Article  1753).87 The Imam 
Mauls have expounded the second view. He permitted a plaintiff to submit 
evidence in support of his claim after the defendant had testified under oath 
on condition that the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of his evidence 
when he asked for the defendant's oath. If on the other hand the plaintiff had 
known of the evidence and had chosen to put the defendant under oath, and 
then, after such an oath, had offered to submit such evidence, it would not be 
acceptable. It is also the view of some Shafi’i jurists including al-Ghazzali.  
The third and last view considers the oath as decisive in a dispute so that a 
plaintiff may not give testimony after that.  
The argument here is that the oath cancels the right of the plaintiff and no 
evidence may be presented based on a right already discharged. It is further 
argued that since truth is presumed on the side of the plaintiff if he should 
tender evidence so that no denial under oath is presented, then truth also 
must be presumed on the side of the defendant if he should deny the claim 
under oath. No further testimony from the plaintiff may be offered after that. 
The adherents of al-Zahiri school have adopted this point of view. Modern 
codes have also adopted this theory; for example, Article 1363 of the French 
Civil Code considers the oath as decisive in the settling of disputes. Most 
French jurists regard the oath as a kind of judicial contract similar to a 
settlement binding upon both parties.88  
Similarly, Article  234  of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure states:  
                                                             
85 See Ali Haydar's commentary on Article 1842 of the Majallah.   
86 A decision in this respect was adopted by the Ottoman Court of Cassation, No.666 on 12 
May (financial year) 1326, (1910 A.D.). See the Turkish journal Jaridah Adliyah, No. 13, p. 
529. The Imam Abu Yusuf disagreed with this opinion and permitted the plaintiff to require 
the defendant to make an oath although he (the plaintiff) may have a ready evidence. As 
regards the Imam Muhammad, al-Khassaf reported that he belonged to the same view as that 
of Abu Yusuf, while al-Tahawi reported that he belonged to the view of Abu Hanifah. See 
Nata'ij al-Afkar, being the continuation of Ibn Hammam, Fath, VI, pp.153-55.  
87 This is in agreement with the opinion of the Imam Muhammad, and in disagreement with 
that of Abu Hanifah. See Ali Haydar in his commentary on Article 1753 of the Majallah. 
Articles 83 and 85 of the Ottoman Law of Civil Procedure required the plaintiff to name his 
witnesses and fix their numbers. 
88 Some have criticized this interpretation. See, for example, Glasson, Traite, II, No. 696, and 
III, No. 736. 
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"If the defendant should take an oath, his opponent may not submit evidence 
to establish the falsehood of that oath. However, if a penal verdict 
establishes the falsehood of the oath, the injured party is entitled to claim 
damages".89 
 
c. Defendant's refusal to take the oath and its retortion 
If the defendant should refuse to take the oath, would judgment be given 
against him on the sole basis of his refusal? Or would the plaintiff then be 
asked to take the oath? There has been some controversy over this issue. 
According to the Hanafi school and the Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, in one 
reported version, "refusal is tantamount to admission". If a defendant refused 
to take the oath, he would be regarded as having admitted the claim of the 
plaintiff. It is argued that if the right were on his side, he would not have 
hesitated to take the oath. Refusal may either be explicit or implicit by 
silence. According to this school of thought, the oath would not be retorted 
to the plaintiff regardless of whether or not the defendant requests to this 
effect.90 It is based on the tradition of the Prophet, which states: "The burden 
of proof is on him who affirms; the oath on him who denies". This tradition 
is unequivocal and contains nothing, which implies that the oath may be 
shifted to the plaintiff. The Majallah adheres to this interpretation (Article 
1820).  
In the opinion of the other imams and that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 
according to a second version, the refusal of the defendant to take the oath is 
not in itself a sufficient ground to render judgment against him, because such 
refusal is a weak method of proof which must be corroborated by the oath of 
the plaintiff whether arising from the defendant's request or not. If the 
plaintiff does take the oath, the judgment would be given in his favour; if 
not, his case would be rejected. In support of their contention, the adherents 
of this opinion explain that the tradition of the Prophet referred to above 
does not mention the possibility that the defendant may refuse to take the 
oath.  
They even cite a tradition of the Prophet in which he decided to retort the 
oath to the plaintiff.91 Imam Malik applied this procedure to cases involving 
property while the Imam al-Shafi`i applied it to all types of cases. A number 
of the latter's followers, however, including al-Ghazzali, disapproved of the 
retortion of the oath where the plaintiff is the Sultan.92 The Imamiyah Shi’ah 
                                                             
89 This is in disagreement with the interpretation of French jurists where the claiming of 
damages in such cases was forbidden. See the decision of the court of Rethel, on 25 January 
1905 (D. 1905. 2. 309). 
90 Guzelhisari, Manafi, 335. 
91Ibn Qudamah (Muwaffaq), Mughni, XII, 124.   
92 Ghazzali, Wajiz, II, 266.   
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school also endorsed the retortion of the oath to the plaintiff.93 Lastly, the 
Zahiri school and Ibn Abi Layla did not accept the defendant's refusal to take 
the oath as a ground for judgement, nor the legality of retorting it save in 
exceptional circumstances. According to this view, if the plaintiff has no 
evidence and the defendant refuses to take the oath as required, he would be 
compelled to do so whether he likes it or not. In other words, a defendant 
may either admit the claim of the plaintiff or deny it and take an oath in 
support of his stand.  
Most modern codes, which accept the oath as a method of proof, have 
chosen a middle course. Like the Hanafi school, they rule against the 
defendant if he refuses to take the oath, but, consistent with the other Islamic 
schools; they allow the defendant to retort the oath to the plaintiff. In such a 
case, if the plaintiff takes the oath, the judgment would be given in his 
favour; if he refuses, his case would be rejected. Thus Article 232 of the 
Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure states: "A person who refuses when asked 
to take an oath, or refuses to retort it to his opponent, or, when retorted by 
his `opponent, refuses to take such an oath, forfeits his claim or his defence".  
 
d. Use of the oath 
The oath is one of the oldest means of establishing proof or of 
adjudication. It is generally based on the principle of reminding the swearer 
of his religious faith and of God who requires truthfulness and integrity. It is 
reasoned that this might induce him to state the truth and deter him from 
expressing lies and falsehood. Judicial experience shows that the oath is a 
weak method of proof, not resorted to except in the absence of other 
evidence and that the persons asked to swear the oath usually do so easily 
except on rare occasions. Its method of proof is not incorporated in several 
civil codes. Although it is adopted in most Latin countries, we find that in 
many other legal systems including the English system, it is not recognized 
as a decisive form of evidence in a sense explained here.  
Moreover, the oath, even in those countries which recognise it, is being 
used less today than formerly. For example, the Ottoman Code of Civil 
Procedure stated: "A person who is incapable of establishing his claim 
should be asked whether or not he wants his opponent to take an oath" 
(Article 92). That is to say; it was the duty of the judge to remind the 
plaintiff of his right to request an oath from the defendant in case the 
plaintiff failed to establish his claim. The Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, 
however, does not require this action.  
 
e. Oath tendered by the judge 
                                                             
93 Hilli, Shara’i, 301.  
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Is a judge entitled, on his initiative, to tender the oath to any of the 
litigants? Several modern legal systems have recognised what is called "the 
suppletory oath" to distinguish it from the decisive oath referred to earlier. In 
the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure it is an oath which a judge, on his 
initiative, requests from either of the two litigant parties when neither the 
claim nor the defence is sufficiently established but when, at the same time, 
they are not wholly devoid of evidence  (Articles  228,  237). In other words, 
if the statements of either of the litigants lack in evidence, the judge may 
require that the oath of that particular litigant supplements them.  
This oath is similar to that required of the plaintiff in some schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence to support the testimony of a sole witness where such 
testimony and the oath of the plaintiff are deemed sufficient. We have 
already observed that the Hanafi school and the Majallah disapprove of this 
procedure of proof. The fundamental rule is enunciated in Article 1746 of 
the Majallah as follows: "The oath is only administered upon the application 
of the opponent. In f our cases, however, the oath is administered by the 
court without any application:  
a. When a person lays claim to and proves that he has an interest in the estate 
of a deceased person, the court shall require the plaintiff to swear an oath 
that he has not received anything by any means, directly or indirectly, in 
satisfaction of his interest from such deceased person, nor has he given a 
release thereof, nor assign edit to any other person, nor received anything 
in satisfaction thereof from any other person, nor received any pawn by 
way of security for his interest from the deceased person. Such form of 
oath is known as istizhar.  
b. When a person appears claiming to be entitled to the certain property and 
proves his case, the court shall require an oath to be taken by such person 
that he has not sold such property, nor disposed of it by way of gift, nor 
divested himself in any way of the ownership therein. 
c. When a person wishes to return a thing purchased on account of the defect, 
the court shall require him to take an oath that he did not, either expressly 
or implicitly, because of any disposition of such a thing, as if it were his 
property ... assent to the defect in the thing purchased.  
d. When the court is about to give judgment in a case of pre-emption, the 
court shall require the person claiming the right of pre-emption to swear an 
oath that he has not waived the right of pre-emption in any way 
whatsoever".  
The first oath, namely istizhar, is agreed upon by all the Hanafi jurists; 
the other oaths were propounded by Imam Abu Yusuf. Later he added to 
them another oath which is taken in the following circumstances:  
If a woman asks for maintenance from her absent husband, she must 
swear in the name of God that her husband had not left her any provisions, 
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nor given her maintenance.94 Finally, the Majallah provides for certain 
circumstances under which a judge may put both parties to the oath,95but 
these are beyond the scope of this book.  
 
f. Other Aspects Of Evidence 
 
a. Documentary Evidence (Al Kitabah) 
In the present day, written evidence consisting of documents and written 
instruments is one of the most important and effective methods of proof. The 
reason for this is the prevalence of literacy today as compared to what it was 
in the past. Many modern codes, including, as we have seen, the Ottoman 
and the Lebanese, required the presence of such evidence in important civil 
cases, and excluded testimony except in restricted and exceptional 
circumstances.  
But this was not the case in the past. For example, a French legal maxim 
in the Middle Ages stated: "Temoins passent lettres".96 Similarly, in the 
shariah, personal evidence (testimony) was the norm, due to the lack of 
writing and recording in the olden days and in view of the fact that people 
were not accustomed to the use of written documents, except in the case of a 
debt payable on a future date where a specific provision was made: "0 ye 
who believe! When ye contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. 
Let a scribe record it in writing between you in terms of justice" (Quran 2: 
282).  
The jurists, however, maintained that written evidence was merely 
recommended and not obligatory.97Therefore, the Islamic books on 
jurisprudence did not attach the great weight to written evidence that they 
gave testimony. Besides, there were many controversies concerning the 
conditions for accepting written evidence. At any rate, it was not regarded by 
jurists as one of the primary methods of proof but was merely mentioned in 
connection with admission by writing and with giving testimony to ascertain 
the authenticity of such writing.98 It will suffice to give a summary of what 
the Majallah provides in this regard. It is a fundamental principle in the 
Hanafi school that no reliance should be placed upon writing, because 
"handwritings  resemble one another", and because writing, to quote Al-
                                                             
94 Ibn al-Bazzaz, Fatawa, V, 68-69; and Articles 97 and 99 of the Ottoman Law of Family 
Rights. 
95Majallah, Article 1778 ff.   
96 Colin et Capitant, Courts, II, 221.    
97 For the interpretation of this verse see Razi, Mafatih, II, 364; and Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, VIII, 
346, No.415. 
98 See for example Sarakhsi, Mabsut, XVIII, 172 ff. ; Hattab, Mawahib, VI, 187 ff. ; and Ibn 
Farhun, Tabsirat, I, p.294.  
Fiat Justisia Jurnal Ilmu Hukum  ISSN 1978-5186 
Volume 13 Number 1, January-March 2019  
69 
Fatawa al-Khayriyah "falls outside the recognised methods of proof in the 
shari'a, namely testimony, admission and refusal to take the oath..."99 
However, as people began to depend more and more upon written 
documents in their transactions, later jurists accepted writing through 
istihsan or preference.100 The Majallah adopted the same course and 
recognised proof using promissory notes, registers of merchants and the like, 
provided; they were free of taints of forgery and fabrication. It considered 
admission in writing the same as oral admission, and it recognised official 
documents if they were free from any taint of fraud or forgery, e.g., the 
Sultan's rescripts, entries in land registers and court files.101 
 
g. Conclusive Presumption  
In conclusion, it is necessary to point out that in addition to the methods 
of proof previously mentioned, i.e. admission, testimony and oath; there is 
still another one which may form a basis for judgments, called conclusive 
presumption. The Majallah says, "A conclusive presumption is also a ground 
for judgment" (Article 1740). It is defined as "an inference, which amounts 
to the degree of certainty. Example: A is seen leaving an empty house with a 
bloodstained knife in his hand; B thereupon enters the house and finds C, 
who has just had his throat cut. There is no doubt that A is the murderer of C 
and no regard is given to the possibility that C killed himself" (Article
 1741). This example, which was related by the jurist Abu al-Yusr 
Muhammad ibn al-Ghars,102is upheld whenever a judge is convinced that the 
fact is certain. Such certainty undoubtedly depends upon the circumstances 
of the case, for it is possible that the frightened person seen leaving the 
house might be a relative of the victim, having hurried to the house upon 
hearing the screams of the victim, picked up the blood-stained knife and 
dashed out calling for help or looking for the murderer to take vengeance on 
him with the same knife. In such a case it would be erroneous to consider 
him the murderer. The Hanafi jurists have cited several examples where a 
presumption may be a ground for judgment. For example, if two persons, 
one being a merchant and the other a shipmaster, should disagree about the 
ownership of a boat loaded with flour and neither of them has any evidence; 
the flour would be presumed to belong to the merchant and the boat to the 
shipmaster.103 
These presumptions are based upon circumstantial facts, public usages 
                                                             
99 Ramli, Fatawa, II, p. 67.  
100 Sarakhsi, Mabsut, loc. cit.; Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, 86; Ibn Abidin, Nashr, 41-42; and 
Guzelhisari, Manafi’, 329.  
101 For details see Majallah, Article 1606-1612 and 1736-1739.  
102 Ibn Abidin, Nashr, 21.  
103Ibid., 19 ff.  
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and the discretion of the judge. Therefore, they have been called "the 
presumptions of customary circumstances". Nowadays they are accepted in 
penal cases and are left to the discretion of the judge and his conscience. In 
civil matters, however, they are not accepted without limitation. In the 
Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, these presumptions have been described 
as de facto presumptions, and have been defined as "results deduced by a 
judge from a known fact to an unknown one". Their application is left 
entirely to the judge's discretion. But they may not be accepted except in 
cases where the law permits the hearing of personal testimony, and only 
when they are "grave, precise and concordant." (Articles 302, 310). 
There is another category of presumptions. They are the legal 
presumptions deduced by the lawmaker from a known fact to be applied to 
an unknown one. The Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure has this example: 
"If the possession of a specific movable property is exercised bona fide, 
peacefully, openly and unequivocally, it is presumed to be coupled with the 
right of ownership, and no evidence contrary to this presumption may be 
entertained" (Article 307).104 Various examples of these legal presumptions 
are found in the shari'a, was discussed some of them while dealing with 
istishab (presumptions of continuity). Another presumption of this kind is 
the presumption of paternity attributed to the husband under certain well-
known conditions, based on the tradition: "The offspring follows the 
(nuptial) bed".105 
 
h. Contradictions in Testimonies  
Some legal maxims relate to contradictions in matters of proof. These 
contradictions are of two types: contradictions in the testimony of witnesses 
and contradictions in the statements of the plaintiff. First- Contradiction in 
the testimony of witnesses. These contradictions occur when witnesses 
change the testimonies previously given. The Majallah says, "Contradiction 
and proof are incompatible, but this does not invalidate a judgment given. 
For example, if witnesses retract their testimony, such testimony is not 
conclusive; but if the court has already given judgment based upon the 
original testimony, such judgment may not be set aside, but the witnesses 
must pay damages equivalent to the value of the subject matter of the 
judgment" (Article 80).  
Article 1728 of the Majallah explains this rule by saying, "Should 
witnesses after giving their evidence, but before judgment, withdraw the 
                                                             
104 This corresponds in French to the rule which says, "En fait de meubles, possession vaut 
titre." 
105 Reported in all recognized tradition collections. See Ayni, Umdat, XXIII, 249, and 
Muslim, Sahih, IV, p.171. 
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evidence in court, such evidence is considered not to have been given, and 
the witnesses shall be reprimanded".  Jurists agree on this point. But "Should 
witnesses who have given evidence in court withdraw such evidence after 
judgment has been delivered, the judgment stands, but the witnesses must 
pay the value of the subject matter of the action to the party against whom 
judgment has been made" (Article 1729). A case is reported to have come up 
before the Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib who heard two witnesses give testimony 
implicating a third person in the act of theft. `Ali ordered that the said 
person's hand be cut off.  The two men later returned with another person 
contending that he was the actual thief and not the man whose hand had been 
cut off. Ali retorted: "I do not believe your charges against this man, and I 
order that you pay blood-money for causing the amputation of the other 
person's hand. If I knew that you had done this deliberately, I would have 
ordered your hands cut off".  
Non-interference with a judgment even after witnesses retract their 
testimony is agreed upon by the majority of jurists. The reason for this ruling 
has been explained in Al-Ihkam by Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi thus: 
"Trustworthy statements and legal causes establish a judgment. A later 
allegation by witnesses that their testimony was false is an admission that 
they are impious, and the statements of such people cannot vitiate a 
judgment".106 However, several jurists including the Imam al-Awzai, Said 
ibn al-Musayyab (d. 709-10 A.D.) and the followers of al-Zahiri school 
disputed this interpretation. They said that a judgment should be revoked in 
all circumstances when witnesses retract their testimony. A judgment, they 
maintained, is established by testimony; if the witnesses withdraw their 
testimony, which established the judgment, it would no longer be valid. 
Some jurists apply this interpretation in penal cases involving public 
 (God's) rights or retaliation so that a verdict would not be enforced if 
witnesses retract their testimony, because it is said that such cases should be 
set aside in the face of doubt.107 Finally, most modern laws grant those 
against whom the testimony is given the right to demand the annulment of 
the decision, within certain conditions, if the falsehood of the testimony 
upon which the judgment was based is established. Thus, Article 349 of the 
Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code and Article 537 of the Lebanese Code of 
Civil Procedure sanction a re-trial in such circumstances.  
Second- Contradiction in the statements of the plaintiff. The Majallah 
defines a contradiction of this kind as "some statement previously made by 
                                                             
106 Qarafi, Ihkam, p.9.  
107 Sarakhsi, Mabsut, XVI, 178; Ibn Qudamah (Shams), Sharh, XII, 113 ff.; Ibn Hazm, 
Muhalla, IX, 429; and Nawawi, Minhaj, 137. See in these references also the question of 
having witnesses make good the damage resulting from also testimony, and the views of the 
various schools.  
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the plaintiff which conflicts with the action he has brought, and which causes 
such action to be declared null and void" (Article 1615). The following are 
some examples:108"If a person admits that certain property belongs to 
another, he may not later bring an action claiming that such property is his . . 
.” (Article 1648). And "If a person releases another from all actions, he may 
not later bring an action against such person claiming from him property 
which he asserts to be his own . . .” (Article  1649). Another article of the 
Majallah says,109 "A thing which has been discharged or annihilated cannot 
be restored" (Article 51). The meaning of this maxim is that if a person 
releases another from a claim he may not retract this release and reclaim the 
same right, because such an action contradicts the release. It is necessary, 
however, that the right in question should belong to the person making the 
release and should be in existence at the time of the release.  
Thus, if a person renounces his right of inheritance before the death of the 
de cujus, his renunciation would not be valid. It would be valid, however, if 
made after such death. This maxim above is derived from another 
maxim:110"If any person seeks to disavow any act performed by himself, 
such an attempt is disregarded" (Article zoo). For example, if the guarantor 
of the seller claims ownership of the thing sold, his claim would not be 
sustained because it contradicts the contract of guarantee.  
 
D. Conclusion 
The existence of legal maxims whether opinion or reality developed as a 
consequence of particulars because it functions as an integrator of sporadic 
particulars together with their meanings. On the other hand, the principle 
must exist before the existence of its particulars because it will be the basis 
for the jurist to determine the rules. Its position is similar to the position of 
the Qur'an concerning the Sunnah and the text of the holy Quran stronger 
than its manifestation. The principles as the precedent to the furu' 
(particulars) mean the particulars pre-existed or were the influence for the 
development of usul al-fiqh. Its position is like the child to the parent, fruit 
to the tree and the plant to the seed. Islamic Legal maxims are similar to 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence in some respects and different in other 
respects. The similarity is that both are principles that cover various 
particulars whereas the difference is that the originating principles cover 
variously detailed proofs whereby it is possible to extract the law from it. On 
the other hand legal maxims are concerned with jurisprudential issues only. 
The mujtahid may reach it by grasping the distinctive — issues in 
                                                             
108 See Majallah, Articles 1647-1659.  
109 Ibn Nujaym, Ashbah, 127.  
110 Ibn Abidin, Radd, I, 5; and Ibn al-Bazzaz, Fatawa, IV, Latin proverb, "Nemo contra 
factum scum venire potest."  
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principles of Islamic jurisprudence. When the jurists apply the rules to 
particular rules, they are not maxims. However if they express the rules with 
universal statements wherein there exist various particular rules, then they 
are deemed as maxims. In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the difference 
between legal maxims and originating principles is the subject matter. The 
subject matter of originating principles is proof of rules. Thus it relates to 
commands, prescriptions, general phrases, specific phrases, absolute phrases, 
conditional phrases, comprehensive phrases, divergent phrases, logic and 
understanding and abrogating and abrogated. 
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